
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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: Greek Cypriots along the Kyrenia Mountain pass north of Nicosia appear to be preparing for an attack aimed at wresting that strategic pass from the Turkish Cypriots.

UN efforts to mediate a cease-fire have failed several times since fighting broke out in this area on 11 April. Renewed attack by the Greek Cypriots is anticipated by the UN forces.


In a preliminary assessment of the Cyprus situation, UN mediator Tuomioja feels that partition or federation are impractical. He suggests an initial approach might be constitutional revision to eliminate the "superprivileges" of the Turkish Cypriots with an international guarantee and perhaps UN presence to ensure the security of the Turkish community.

According to a conversation on 10 April between the US ambassador and Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece, the Greek Government feels that complete independence for Cyprus is the only solution possible at this time. This the prime minister felt would include the abolishment of all recent treaties which had proved unworkable.

The Turkish Government, disillusioned with the course of events, has passed a new law extending the fishing limits of Turkey from six to twelve miles effective in three months. Athens immediately announced that it would not recognize this move. Turkey reportedly has a long list of other measures designed to put pressure on Greece.

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(Map)



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\*South Vietnam: The Viet Cong are stepping up their attacks on population centers.

Yesterday a Viet Cong force estimated at two battalions temporarily overran Kien Long, a district capital in Chuong Thien Province southwest of Saigon. Government reinforcements reoccupied the town after a sharp engagement.

This was the second assault in four days on an important town in the Mekong Delta. Last week the Viet Cong advanced against Mo Cay in Kien Hoa Province, but were repulsed by government troops. Casualties on both sides in the fighting were substantial.

Attacks such as these, perhaps more than any kind of operation, serve to boost Viet Cong prestige. Hence isolated district capitals are likely to be prime targets for future assaults.

On 11 April General Khanh in talking with Ambassador Lodge admitted that his forces have suffered reverses. He claimed, however, that his efforts to improve the army's fighting capabilities were "really getting results."

Sino-Soviet Dispute: Khrushchev, glossing over his differences with some of the Eastern European countries on tactics to be followed in the Sino-Soviet dispute, is trying to present a picture of unanimity among these countries.

Despite claims of unanimity in Khrushchev's 12 April public address and in the 11 April Hungarian-Soviet communiqué, the Hungarians still have not endorsed the Soviet wish to convene an international Communist conference.

Khrushchev's playing down the significance of conversations with individual parties is apparently aimed at the talks with a Polish delegation under Gomulka, which is to arrive in Moscow today. Unlike the Czechs, who issued a statement of endorsement on 11 April, the Poles have called for "consultations" rather than a definitive international conference.

Yugoslavia has explicitly rejected the idea of a conference. Rumania, which will not hold a party plenum until 15 April, has not taken a position.

Zanzibar: President Karume's pro-Communist regime has intensified pressure to drive the US from Zanzibar.

There have been three anti-US demonstrations in the past four days. These demonstrations, directed against the US Embassy and the NASA tracking station, have been sanctioned by President Karume and were organized by Zanzibar officials.

\*Yesterday Karume told the US chargé that the Government of Zanzibar had nothing against Americans and did not want them to leave. He denied that he would press for early withdrawal of the station.

However, it is possible that Karume will renege on his private assurances given last week that the US would have 60 days to remove the station, citing the demonstrations as evidence that an earlier withdrawal is "the will of the people."

Kashmir: The Indian Government's go-slow warning to Sheikh Abdullah, the popular Kashmiri leader, reflects New Delhi's sensitivity over his plain talk about Kashmiri self-determination.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, Nehru's heir apparent, told the Indian Parliament on 11 April that "there can be no freedom for preaching some kind of independence or for Kashmir going out of India." He had played a key role in making the controversial decision to release Abdullah on 8 April after 11 years' imprisonment in the hope of stabilizing the political situation in Kashmir.

Shastri was probably deeply offended by Abdullah's quick assertion that Pakistan as well as India must be satisfied by a permanent solution of the Kashmir problem. Equally disturbing to the Indians is the Sheikh's insistence that the Kashmiri people have never been given a real voice in determining their own status. He has, in the past, urged independence as a possible solution.

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as a possible solution

#### NOTES

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Arab States - Israel: Nasir appears at least for the time being to be carrying out his promise of last week to halt the UAR's anti-US propaganda. The Cairo press has made no comment in the last several days on the US air base in Libya, nor did it exploit the US abstention on last week's UN resolution deploring the British air attack on Yemen. Cairo also has not mentioned reports carried by other Arab newspapers on the possible sale of US tanks to Israel, which suggests Nasir may be waiting to see how this issue is resolved.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Korea: Student unrest which developed over the protest of a settlement with Japan is now beginning to focus on the government's failure to improve economic conditions. Influenced by North Korean claims of economic progress, South Korean students are showing increasing interest in the concept of reunification as an economic panacea. 25X1 local leftists are convincing the students that reunification is the only solution because Japanese indemnity payments will 25X1 not last long and US aid is declining.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

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